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THE ISSUE 
The European Union energy system is becoming greener and more efficient, but its 
most polluting component – coal – continues to provide a quarter of its electricity. 
This is bad for the climate, the environment and human health. A number of EU 
countries continue to support coal politically for energy security and socio-economic 
reasons. The energy security argument is understandable, but the feasibility of the 
energy transition away from coal should not be doubted. Several countries have 
already successfully phased out coal without compromising energy security or 
competitiveness. The socio-economic argument is illusory. Coal mining employment in 
Europe does not represent a sizable issue either at national or regional level.
POLICY CHALLENGE 
The EU should propose that its member countries speedily phase out coal. At the same 
time, it should put in place a scheme to guarantee the social welfare of coal miners who 
stand to lose their jobs. The EU does not need to establish a new fund for this; it only 
needs to make better use of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF). For 
the post-2020 period, the EGF should be transformed into a ‘European Globalisation 
and Climate Adjustment Fund’ with a higher budget overall, of which €150 million per 
year should be used to support coal mining regions. By mobilising 0.1 percent of its 
total budget, the EU could provide a significant incentive to coal-reliant member states 
to phase out coal, generating substantial benefits for the climate, the environment and 
human health.
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EUROPE’S DIRTY ENERGY SECRET
Since 2000, Europe’s energy system has 
gone through a profound transformation, 
underpinned by rapid advances in re-
newable energy technologies, the costs of 
which have dropped1, and strong decar-
bonisation policies, such as the EU 2020 
climate and energy package (Tagliapietra 
and Zachmann, 2015).
But although the EU electricity system 
has modernised and become greener, it 
has also maintained its oldest and most 
polluting component: coal. The share 
of this fossil fuel in the EU electricity 
generation mix stands at 25 percent, 
having declined by only 5 percentage 
points between 2000 and 2015.
Coal remains predominant in 
electricity generation in several EU 
countries: 80 percent in Poland, 77 
percent in Estonia2 and 49 percent in 
the Czech Republic, for example (Figure 
1). Only a few EU countries have taken 
decisions to close their coal-fired power 
plants. The United Kingdom was the first 
country to set a date for ending the use 
of coal; its last coal-fired power plant is 
due to close by 2025. France followed 
this example, by setting a phase-out 
date of 2022. The Netherlands and Italy 
have also proposed plans to close their 
coal-fired power plants by 2030 and 2025 
respectively.
The persistent role of coal in the EU 
electricity system represents a problem for 
the climate, for the environment and for 
human health. From a climate perspective, 
coal is the worst way to generate electricity. 
Carbon dioxide (CO
2
) emissions from coal 
are higher than those of oil and gas. To 
generate the same amount of electricity, 
a coal-fired power plant emits 40 percent 
more CO
2 
than a gas-fired power plant 
and 20 percent more than an oil-fired 
power plant (UNFCCC, 2017). To produce 
enough electricity for an average European 
household for one year, five tonnes of 
CO
2
 would be emitted if the electricity 
was generated from coal, three tonnes 
if generated from gas and zero tonnes if 
generated from wind and solar.
There are very limited ways to improve 
the efficiency of coal and to make it cleaner. 
New more efficient, or ‘ultra-supercritical’, 
coal power stations still produce 
substantially more CO
2
 than gas power 
stations. Meanwhile, carbon capture and 
storage technology remains unproven as a 
fully integrated process. Effective capture 
technology has not been developed 
and safe long-term storage at the scale 
necessary has not been demonstrated. 
Therefore, it is hard to see how carbon 
capture and storage for coal would ever be 
able to compete on price with renewables, 
the costs of which are rapidly falling.
Coal is broadly bad for the environment, 
beyond being bad for the climate. Coal-
fired power plants across Europe are 
responsible for the largest volumes of 
sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and 
particulate matter released into the air 
(European Environment Agency, 2017a). 
Figure 1: EU countries’ electricity generation mixes (2015)
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat (2017). Note: Estonia generates electricity with oil shale, a solid fuel similar to coal.
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1. In particular, wind and so-
lar have rapidly entered the 
European Union electricity 
system, increasing their 
share in the generation mix 
from 0.7 percent in 2000 to 
13 percent in 2015.
2. Estonia generates electrici-
ty with oil shale, a solid fuel 
similar to coal. 
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These pollutants have a range of health 
effects, causing, in particular, breathing 
problems such as asthma and bronchitis, 
which can even prove fatal. Up to 400,000 
premature deaths annually in the EU 
are attributed to air pollution (European 
Commission, 2017a). Heavy metals such 
as mercury are also released into the air by 
coal-fired power plants. These can impact 
the immune system, with children most 
at risk. According to the World Health 
Organisation (2017), 33 out of the 50 
most-polluted cities and towns in Europe 
are located in Poland, notably in the coal 
mining region of Upper Silesia.
COAL: AN OBSTACLE TO EU 
DECARBONISATION
The EU’s energy and climate policy archi-
tecture has at its core an aim to deliver 
decarbonisation. On the basis of a long-
term vision of reducing greenhouse-gas 
emissions by 80-95 percent by 2050 com-
pared to 1990, the EU adopted a binding 
40 percent emissions reduction target to 
be achieved by 2030 compared to 1990. 
This target is also the basis of the EU’s 
international commitment to the Unit-
ed Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) Paris Agree-
ment (European Commission, 2016a).
Turning these targets into reality is 
challenging. It requires radical changes 
to Europe’s power, heating and cooling, 
industry and transport sectors. This task 
will become even more challenging if 
the global effort against global warming 
is reinforced. The current EU 2050 
decarbonisation trajectory is calibrated 
against the target of keeping the global 
temperature rise this century below 
2 degrees Celsius compared to pre-
industrial levels. This is also the central 
aim of the Paris Agreement. In addition, 
the Paris Agreement pledges to pursue 
efforts to limit the temperature increase 
to 1.5 degrees Celsius (a significantly 
safer defence line against the worst 
impacts of a changing climate) (United 
Nations, 2015). 
In 2018, the European Commission 
will update its 2050 low carbon economy 
roadmap (European Commission, 2011), 
to align it with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5 
degrees pledge. In that context, the EU is 
set to raise its level of ambition, pledging 
full decarbonisation of the economy 
by 2050 (Euractiv, 2017). That could 
also entail the full decarbonisation of 
electricity generation well before 2050. To 
make this possible, a complete phase-out 
of coal will be necessary. Currently, coal 
generates 75 percent of the CO
2
 emissions 
from the EU’s electricity and heat sector, 
which in turn represents a quarter of the 
EU’s total CO
2
 emissions (Figure 2).
It should be underlined that the role of 
electricity and heat in total CO
2
 emissions 
greatly varies from country to country. The 
share ranges from 61 percent in Estonia to 
40 percent in Poland; from 33 percent in 
Germany to 18 percent in Italy; down to 
7 percent in France (Figure 2, left panel). 
However, coal is the predominant source 
of CO
2
 emissions in the sector in almost all 
countries (Figure 2, right panel).
IS THE EU READY AND EQUIPPED TO 
TACKLE ITS COAL PROBLEM?
Given its strong decarbonisation policy, 
why has the EU not acted so far to solve 
this coal problem? The answer can be 
found in the EU Treaties, and in par-
ticular in Article 194 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU (TFEU), which 
defines energy policy as a shared com-
petence between the EU and its member 
countries, but which provides the right 
for each member country to “determine 
the conditions for exploiting its energy 
resources, its choice between different 
energy sources and the general structure of 
its energy supply”3.
The EU has tried circumnavigate the 
Treaty’s energy limitations and reshape 
the EU energy mix on the basis of its 
competence for environmental policy. 
In particular, the EU has adopted over 
time four major initiatives with the aim 
of promoting an electricity sector based 
more on renewables and less on coal: 
i) the Renewable Energy and Energy 
Efficiency Directives4; ii) the emissions 
trading system (ETS)5; iii) the Industrial 
Emissions Directive (IED);6 iv) the 
Environmental Performance Standard 
(EPS)7.
3. Consolidated Version of the 
Treaty on European Union 
art. 194, 2010 O.J. C 83/01.
4.   Directive 2009/28/EC and 
Directive 2012/27/EU; they 
established a set of binding 
measures to help the EU 
reach its 20 percent renew-
able energy and 20 percent 
energy efficiency targets by 
2020. 
5. Directive 2003/87/EC; in-
tended as the cornerstone 
of the EU’s policy to com-
bat global warming and to 
be its key tool for reducing 
emissions cost effectively. 
However, it has not so far 
delivered a high enough 
carbon price. 
6.   Directive 2010/75/EU ; the 
IED aims to reduce harmful 
industrial emissions by 
setting limits on certain 
pollutants emitted by large 
combustion plants, includ-
ing coal-fired power plants. 
The IED might lead to the 
retirement of the oldest 
coal-fired power plants, 
but all others will continue 
running.
7. The European Commission 
proposed in November 
2016 to set a 550 grammes 
CO2/kWh limit for new 
power plants eligible to 
take part in national capac-
ity remuneration mech-
anisms (with a transition 
period of five years). This 
proposal is part of ‘Clean 
Energy for All Europeans’, 
a draft package of clean 
energy legislation that is 
expected to be approved 
and adopted around late 
2018 or early 2019. See 
European Commission 
(2016b). 
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Figure 2: CO2 emissions, electricity and heat sectors of EU countries
Source: Bruegel based on European Environment Agency (2017b).
As coal remains persistently present in 
the EU energy system, it is clear that these 
initiatives have not yet delivered the 
coal phase-out the EU needs to unleash 
decarbonisation. This reflects coal’s 
political sensitivity for several coal-reliant 
EU countries.
For instance, supporting ‘coal jobs’ 
is a key priority of Poland’s ruling Law 
and Justice party. It was the key element 
behind the trade unions’ backing for 
the party in the October 2015 elections 
(Bloomberg, 2017). In 2017, Poland 
and Greece refused to sign Eurelectric’s 
pledge not to build new coal power plants 
after 2020 (Platts, 2017). In Germany the 
threat of job losses and wider economic 
repercussions have also so far deterred 
politicians from committing to a deadline 
to ditch coal. Despite growing public 
pressure, the German government has 
continued to tacitly support the country’s 
coal industry (DW, 2017).
In general, two arguments are used by 
governments to support coal – or at least 
to procrastinate over its phase-out:
1. Energy security and competitiveness;
2. Job losses and wider economic 
repercussions for coal-mining regions.
The first argument – energy – is 
reasonable. A country that is highly reliant 
on coal for its electricity cannot switch 
overnight to other cleaner sources of 
electricity. However, many EU countries 
have already successfully phased out coal 
without compromising energy security 
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Coal remains 
persistently present 
in the EU energy 
system, reflecting its 
political sensitivity 
for several coal-
reliant EU countries
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and competitiveness, showing that a 
transition away from coal is feasible.
The second argument – socio-
economic – is illusory and should not 
be accepted. Coal mining employment 
in Europe no longer represents a sizable 
issue either at national or regional levels. 
Production of hard coal in the EU has 
been decreasing since 1990. In 2016, only 
36 percent of EU hard coal consumption 
was covered by domestic production, 
with the remainder imported from Russia, 
Colombia, Australia, the United States and 
other minor suppliers. Only the lignite 
consumed in the EU is almost entirely 
supplied by domestic production.
Phasing-out coal would therefore not 
have substantial implications in terms 
of job losses. Given the relatively small 
scale of the challenge, the EU could well 
provide a solution for the (limited) ‘coal 
jobs’ that will be lost in the transition. 
Providing such a solution would be 
beneficial to:
1. Re-focus the coal transition debate 
on the only area it should belong to, 
energy economics;
2. Provide an incentive to coal-reliant 
countries to start or accelerate coal 
phase-out plans. That is, the EU 
should openly propose to member 
states a speedy phase out of coal, and 
should concurrently put in place a 
scheme to guarantee social support 
for coal industry workers who would 
face losing their jobs.
The EU country with the highest 
number of coal mining jobs is Poland, 
with around 115,500 people employed in 
coal mines and related businesses. 
This represents a mere 0.71 percent 
of Poland’s total employment. In all 
other countries coal mining employment 
stands below 30,000, always representing 
less than 0.6 percent of total employment 
(Figure 3).
Even at regional level, loss of coal-
mining jobs would no longer represent 
a sizeable hit. In coal-mining regions 
across Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Bulgaria, Greece and Germany, coal-
mining employment generally stands 
below 10,000 jobs – and below 1 percent 
of total regional employment. 
Only in Poland’s Silesia do coal mining 
jobs exceed 50,000, representing 5 percent 
of regional employment (Figure 4).
Europe can manage the transition 
in coal-mining regions. To ensure their 
social and economic cohesion during the 
phase-out, the EU should put in place a 
mechanism to provide assistance – as is 
already the case in the United States and 
Canada, and as was the case in Europe 
during the coal-mining transformation of 
the 1950s.
Europe’s 1950s transition mechanism 
for coal-mining regions was the 
European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) Fund for the Retraining and 
Resettlement of Workers. It was created 
on the basis of Article 56 of the ECSC 
Treaty, to facilitate re-employment 
opportunities for those coal and steel 
workers who lost their jobs as a result 
of the introduction of new technical 
processes or new equipment8.
The fund represented the first attempt 
at a European social and regional policy. 
With the 1957 Treaty of Rome, this fund 
was transformed into the European 
Social Fund (ESF), which in its early 
stages was indeed used to support 
workers who lost their jobs in sectors that 
were modernising, such as coal mining 
(European Commission, 2007).
USING THE EUROPEAN GLOBALISATION 
ADJUSTMENT FUND TO ENSURE A ‘JUST 
TRANSITION’ IN COAL REGIONS
The concept of ‘just transition’ has re-
cently entered the EU energy and climate 
policy debate. In the framework of the 
broader revision of the ETS Directive, the 
European Parliament proposed in Febru-
ary 2017 the creation of a ‘Just Transition 
Fund’, pooling 2 percent of revenues from 
the auctioning of emission allowances 
to support regions with a high share of 
workers in carbon-dependent sectors 
and a GDP per capita well below the EU 
average9. This proposal was rapidly dis-
missed during the negotiations between 
the European Parliament, the European 
Commission and the Council of the EU 
on the ETS Directive revision. 
8.  See Article 56 of the ECSC 
Treaty: "If the introduction 
of technical processes or 
new equipment within the 
framework of the general 
programs of the High 
Authority, should lead to 
an exceptional reduction 
in labor requirements in 
the coal or steel industries, 
creating special difficulties 
in one or more areas for 
the re-employment of the 
workers released, the High 
Authority, on the request 
of the interested govern-
ments (...) may facilitate 
the financing of programs 
for the creation of new 
and economically sound 
activities capable of assuring 
productive employment to 
the workers thus released."
9.   European Parliament 
(2017a), Amendment 11, 
Proposal for a directive, 
Recital 6.
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Figure 3: Coal mining employment in EU countries
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat (2017) and Euracoal (2017).
Figure 4: Coal mining employment in EU countries and regions
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat (2017).
That proposal did not survive was a result 
of both a lack of concreteness and the 
opposition of the European Commission 
(according to which such an initiative 
would not fit into the ETS area of compe-
tence).
But the EU does not need to establish 
a new fund to support the transition of 
coal mining regions. It only needs to 
make a better use of the already existing 
European Globalisation Adjustment 
Fund (EGF), which was established in 
2006 and has a maximum annual budget 
of €150 million for the 2014-20 period – a 
budget ceiling that has so far not been 
fully employed, with on average €40 
million disbursed from the EGF each 
year.
The EGF supports workers who lose 
their jobs as a result of major structural 
changes in world trade patterns resulting 
from globalisation. It can be triggered 
only when more than 500 workers are 
made redundant by a single company, 
or if a large number of workers are laid 
off in a particular sector in one or more 
neighbouring regions. The EGF provides 
up to 60 percent of the funding for projects, 
lasting up to two years, to help workers who 
have been made redundant find another 
job or set up their own business. EU 
countries apply for finance from the EGF 
and national or regional authorities oversee 
the deployment of project funds.
The EGF has been transformed over 
time. In 2009, its scope was broadened 
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10. In 2017, a first coal-related 
project was financed by the 
EGF, to support the Spanish 
coal mining region of Castil-
la y León. Spain applied for 
a €1 million to help redun-
dant coal miners and young 
NEETs in the region to find 
new jobs, following the dis-
missal of 339 coal workers 
in five coal mines. In order 
to be eligible, Spain had to 
establish a link between the 
redundancies and major 
structural changes in world 
trade patterns resulting 
from globalisation. Spain 
successfully argued that the 
European coal industry is 
increasingly suffering from 
competition from cheaper 
coal from non-European 
countries (European Com-
mission, 2017c; European 
Parliament, 2017b).
11. Regulation (EU) No 
1309/2013.
12. That amendment not 
only broadened the scope 
of the EGF, but it also: i) 
Increased the EGF contri-
bution from 50 percent to 
65 percent of total costs; 
ii) Reduced the threshold 
from 1000 to 500 redun-
dancies; iii) Extended the 
implementation period 
from 12 to 24 months from 
the date of application. 
See: Regulation (EC) No 
546/2009 of 18 June 2009.
13. This is in line with the 
broader estimates in Claeys 
and Sapir (2017) on the 
EGF's future financial 
requirements, according 
to which in the post-2020 
budget the EGF should be 
endowed with €1 billion 
per year to be able to pro-
vide a structural response 
to globalisation-related job 
losses.
to also support people losing their jobs 
as a result of the global financial and 
economic crisis. In 2014, the categories 
of workers eligible for support were 
broadened to also include young people 
not in employment, education or training 
(NEETs). In short, the EGF has been 
adapted to provide a response to the 
new economic and social challenges 
emerging in Europe. This flexibility 
should now be used to further broaden 
the scope of the EGF to support people 
losing their jobs in coal mining regions as 
a result of the decarbonisation process10.
This can be immediately done by 
amending the current regulation11 
governing the EGF for the period 2014-
20, as was done in 2009 to respond to the 
negative impact on employment of the 
global financial and economic crisis12. 
The amendment could increase the 
use of the currently under-utilised EGF 
(Claeys and Sapir, 2017).
The amendment could: 
1. Broaden the scope of the EGF, to 
also include support for coal-mining 
regions in EU countries that commit 
to a timely coal phase-out;
2. Modify the redundancies 
requirements, to allow the EGF not 
only to be used once the workers are 
already phased out, but also before 
this happens. This would allow the 
planning of an orderly transition, 
limiting the socio-economic effects 
of the coal phase-out in these 
regions;
3. Extend the implementation period 
from 24 to 36 months, to allow a 
proper implementation of the action in 
complex cases, such as the closure of 
coal mines.
In the framework of the post-2020 
EU budget, the focus of the EGF on 
coal mining regions could be further 
strengthened, transforming it to a 
‘European Globalisation and Climate 
Adjustment Fund’ (EGCF).
In order to facilitate a full-scale EU 
coal phase-out by the end of the next EU 
budget cycle (ie 2027), the EGCF would 
need to be endowed with adequate 
financial resources. As Box 1 suggests, 
the ‘coal-item’ of the EGCF budget for 
the 2020-27 should be €154 million per 
year13. By mobilising only 0.1 percent 
of its total budget, the EU could thus 
provide a strong incentive to coal-
reliant member states to complete the 
coal phase-out, generating substantial 
benefits in terms of climate, environment 
and human health.
CONCLUSIONS 
The EU energy and climate policy architec-
ture has at its core an aim to deliver decar-
bonisation. However, coal still represents a 
major component of the European energy 
system, with several countries continuing 
to support it politically for energy security 
and socio-economic reasons.  
The EU should de-politicise coal by 
providing a solution to the related socio-
economic issues, such as the difficulties 
of transition in coal mining regions. To do 
so, the EU should broaden the scope and 
change the functioning of the European 
Globalisation Adjustment Fund, to make it 
into a flagship EU initiative that will support 
European coal miners who will inevitably 
be affected by EU decarbonisation. By 
devoting 0.1 percent of its post-2020 budget 
to this item, the EU could facilitate the 
elimination of a major stumbling block on 
its decarbonisation pathway.
Box 1: A back-of-the-envelope calculation of the EGCF budget requirements to support 
the coal phase-out
Europeans employed in coal mining = 216,000 (0.07 percent of total)
Assuming a 50 percent phase-out between 2020-27 = 108,000 jobs to be phased out
(Fair to assume that part of the remaining 50 percent will naturally retire over the period)
108,000 / 7 years = 15,430 jobs to be phased out yearly between 2020-2027
Assuming financial support of €10,000 per worker = €154 million per year
Total financial requirement for the coal-item of the EGCF between 2020-27 = €1 billion
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